Freezing Controls: The Effects on an Unlicensed Transaction by Bittker, Boris I & Berger, Raoul
FREEZING CONTROLS: THE EFFECTS OF
AN UNLICENSED TRANSACTION
RAOUL BERGER and BORIS 1. BITTKER
On April 10, 1940-forty-eight hours after Germany began her invasion
of Denmark and Norway-the United States prohibited a wide range of
transactions in the assets within this country owned by the Governments of
the invaded countries and by their nationals.1 By depriving the Axis of
access to these funds and securities, Executive Order No. 8389 forestalled
their use for subversive activities in this country or for commercial dealings
with European neutrals, at the same time protecting the alien owners and
their American creditors against forced transfers of the properties. 2 In
successive months freezing controls were extended to the assets of the Low
Countries and of France3 ; the coverage of the Order continued to match the
march of events until, with the President's declaration of an unlimited na-
1. Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 FED. RE. 1400 (1940). For present purposes, the more
significant transactions prohibited by this Order, as amended, are transfers of credit be-
tween banks, payments by or to banks, transactions in foreign exchange, and transfers of
evidences of indebtedness or of ownership of property, provided that the transaction either
(1) is by or on behalf of a foreign country designated in the Order or a national thereof,
or (2) involves property in which a designated foreign country or a national thereof has
had any interest since the effective date of the Order. The principal documents relating to
the freezing program may be found in DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO FOREIGN FUNDS CON-
TROL (U. S. Dep't Treas. 1945) and supplements thereto (hereinafter TREAsURY Docu-
MENTS). For general discussion, see ADMINISTRATION OF THE, WARTIME FINANCIAL AND
PROPERTY CONTROLS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (U. S. Dep't Treas. 1942)
(hereinafter TREASURY CONTROLS) ; Reeves, The Control of Foreign Funds by the United
Slates Treasury, 11 LAw AND CONTEMP. PaoB. 17 (1945). No views are herein expressed
as to the range of the transactions to which the Order applies.
The underlying authority for the foreign funds control program is § 5(b) of the
Trading With The Enemy Act, as amended. [55 STAT. 839 (1941), 50 U. S. C. ArP. § 616
(Supp. 1946)]. The program was launched under the aegis of § 5(b) as it existed after its
amendment by the Emergency Bank Legislation of 1933 [48 STAT. 1 (1933), 50 U. S. C.
APP. § 5 (b) (1940)], but Executive Order No. 8389 and the regulations issued thereunder
were approved and confirmed by the Joint Resolution of May 7, 1940, 54 STAT. 179
(1940). A similar ratification of existing regulations was included in the First War
Powers Act [55 STAT. 840 (1941), 50 U. S. C. APP. § 617 (Supp. 1946)], which again
amended § 5(b). The program may be regarded, therefore, as possessing from its incep-
tion the sanction of § 5 (b) as presently constituted. For the program's constitutionality,
see United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F. 2d 968 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S.
769 (1943); McNulty, Constifutionality of Alien Property Controls, 11 LAw AND
CoNTEMP. PROB. 135, 136-39'(1945).
2. In the Brief for United States as arnicus curiae, pp. 5-14, Commission for Polish
Relief v. Banca Nationala a Rumaniei, 288 N. Y. 332, 43 N. E. 2d 345 (1942), the pur-
poses of the controls are summarized as follows:
"1. Protecting property of persons in occupied countries .... 2. Preventing the Axis,
now our enemy, from acquiring any benefit from these blocked assets .... 3. Facilitating
the use of blocked assets in the United Nations war effort and protecting American banks
and business institutions .... 4. Protecting American creditors .... 5. Foreign rela-
tions, including post-war negotiations and settlements."
For the evolution of these purposes, see Littauer, The Un!reeving of Foreign Funds, 45
COLUMBIA LAw REv. 132, 134-137 (1945).
3. The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg: Exec. Order No. 8405, 5 FED. REG.
1677 (1940) ; France: Exec. Order No. 8446, 5 id. at 2279.
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tional emergency on June 14, 1941, the controls were extended to the assets
of Germany, Italy, and every other European country not previously em-
braced.4  Eminently successful in achieving their intended purposes in war-
time,5 the controls imposed by Executive Order No. 8389 are now in the
process of liquidation.6 It is not surprising, since the prohibitions of the
Order called an unaccustomed halt to free trade in eight and one half billion
dollars' worth of assets,7 that "defrosting" has accentuated a number of old
legal problems and has brought with it a myriad of new ones.
Not the least perplexing of these issues is one which has long hovered in
the background: what are the legal consequences of an attempted transfer of
frozen assets in violation of the Order? If a custodian of a blocked account
is confronted with a post-defrosting assignment of blocked property, when
he knows of the existence of (or has been requested to honor) an unlicensed
pre-defrosting assignment, can he safely ignore the unlicensed document and
honor the post-defrosting instrument, particularly when he must take into
account the possibility that eventually the freezing controls will be entirely
revoked? In administering the return provisions recently added by Congress
to the Trading with the Enemy Act,s what weight should the Office of Alien
Property9 give to claims based upon unlicensed transactions? What is the ef-
fect of an unlicensed assignment or attachment of frozen funds upon an order
of the Office of Alien Property vesting the funds,1 0 in view of the Government's
4. Exec. Order No. 8785, 6 FED. REG. 2897 (1941).
5. We have official Japanese testimony for the paralyzing effectiveness of the pro-
gram. Freezing made it "impossible for Nippon to continue trade with the nations employing
the settlement of accounts system based on-the American dollar," and it isolated "Nippon
from the supply of essential wartime materials and frustrated Nippon's design to establish
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." THE AMERICAN-BRITISH CHALLENGE
DR c'rm AGAINST NIPpOx, 79, 81 (official pamphlet published by the Japanese Govern-
ment, 1943).
See also the German decree promulgated in Holland requiring the reporting of all se-
curities not bearing a tax stamp, to counter the Treasury program. TR-AsUxv CoNmoLs,
supra note i, at 22.
6. The controls were relaxed for future transactions by General License No. 94,
issued Dec. 7, 1945, [10 FED. REG. 14814 (1945)], and the release of property previously
blocked was authorized under certain circumstances by General License No. 95, issued
Dec. 29, 1945. [10 FED. REG. 15414 (1945)]. The latter provides for the release of blocked
property upon certification by the designated agent of a specified foreign country (the list
of which, at present writing, included the liberated European countries plus Switzerland
and Liechtenstein) that no non-specified country or national thereof has had any interest
in the property at any time since the effective date of the Order. The procedure is more
fully described by Littauer, Defrosting of Foreign Funds, 1 Woar TRADE L. J. 163
(1946) ; see also Littauer, supra note 2.
7. See Hearings before Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 1000, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1946).
8. Pub. L. No. 322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., (March 8, 1946).
9. The functions formerly performed by the Office of Alien Property Custodian are
now exercised by the Office of Alien Property, in the Department of Justice.
10. Exec. Order No. 9095 [7 FED. REG. 1971 (1942)], as amended by Exec. Order
No. 9567 [10 id. 6917 (1945)] authorizes the vesting of German and Japanese-owned
funds and securities.
HeinOnline -- 47 Colum. L. Rev. 399 1947
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
practice of leaving American interests in foreign-owned property inviolate ?
Answers to these and many other questions cannot be giren without an analy-
sis, long overdue, of the aims and methods of freezing controls with particular
emphasis on the legal status of an unlicensed transaction.
The prohibitions of Section 1 of the Executive Order have the approval
and implement the purpose of Congress. 12 That purpose was
"preventing change of title of the property here in the United States by conquest, or
by any other forcible or violent means."'
It is familiar learning that a contract made in violation of a valid prohibi-
tion designed for police or regulatory purposes is void,14 even when not
expressly declared void.15 By Paragraph (1) of General Ruling No. 12,1
said in the accompanying Press Release No. 3411 to be only declaratory of
11. The interests of American citizens in foreign-owned property are either left un-
touched by the Custodian's vesting order, as when he seizes only the "right, title and in-
terest" of the foreign national, or, if displaced, as by the vesting of a described "res " may
be reasserted in a proceeding under § 9 (a) of the Trading With The Enemy Act. ertain
persons, including aliens, may assert their rights under § 32. Pub. L. No. 322, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess., (March 8,1946).
12. See note 1 supra.
13. 86 CONG. Rrc. 5007 (1940) (Senator Connally). Senator Wagner pointed out
that under the Act of 1917 "no transfers could be made by citizens of another country
owning property here without a license from the Government." (Id. at 5008). Senator
Glass said "The plain intent of the joint resolution is to prevent Germany from appro-
priating the property, now in the United States belonging to the two nations she is now
overwhelming." (Id. at 5176). Senator Connally emphasized that it required the presi-
dent's "permission to transfer the title." (Id. at 5179).
In reporting the amendment to § 5(b) of the Trading With The Enemy Act, subse-
quently embodied in Title III of the First War Powers Act [55 STAT. 839 (1941), 50
U. S. C. App. § 616 (Supp. 1946)] the Senate Judiciary Committee said: "The existing
foreign property control regulations (popularly known as 'freezing control') have per-
mitted the Government to prevent and regulate transactions relating to foreign property.
SE-. Rm. No. 911, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941). See also H. R. REP. No. 1507,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1941).
14. Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U. S. 129 (1922) ; Hartman v. Lubar, 133 F.2d 44 (App.
D. C. 1942); Suspine v. Compania Transatlantica Centroamericana, 37 F. Supp. 268,
(S. D. N. Y. 1941); United States v. Dake, 42 F. Supp. 833 (N. D. N. Y. 1941) (viola-
tion of administrative order). The law of New York is not to the contrary. Adler v.
Zimmerman, 233 N. Y. 431, 135 N. E. 840 (1922). Compare John E. Rosasco Creameries
Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N. Y. 274, 11 N. E.2d 908 (1937), wuith Flegenheimer v. Brogan, 284
N. Y. 268, 30 N. E.2d 591 (1940).
15. Barlett v. Vinor, Carth. 251, 90 Eng. Rep. 750 (1693) (Lord Holt) ; The Pio-
neer, 19 Fed. Cas. 711, No. 11,177 (D. Ore. 1864) ; cf. Lakos v. Saliaris, 116 F.2d 440
(C. C. A. 4th 1940).
16. 7 FED. Ra. 2991 (1942). In addition to drawing on § 12 of Exec. Order No.
8389, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury "to prescribe ... regulations ...
to carry out the purposes of this Order" the Treasury could rely on that portion of § 5 (b)
of the Trading With The Enemy Act which authorizes the president or his delegate to
• . . nullify, void . . . any . . . transfer . . . or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest. . . ."
17. TREsAURY DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 100. A few problems as to the scope of
General Ruling No. 12 may here be noted. Since the Ruling applies by its terms only to
property in "blocked accounts" (as defined by General Ruling No. 4, [5 FED. REG. 2133
(1940), 6 id. 2583, 3350 (1941)], it has been suggested that the Treasury's policy with re-
spect to other categories of frozen assets may be less drastic. (Littauer, supra note 2, at
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existing law, the Treasury declared that unlicensed transactions are "null and
void," or as the Press Release puts it "void and unenforceable."
The stringency of these provisions was not unintended: a basic purpose
of the Order was to prevent the Axis from using the American assets of in-
vaded or overrun countries in order to obtain supplies from neutral countries;
to achieve this result, it was imperative to blast any hope which neutral
speculators might entertain of waiting for ultimate lifting of the freezing
controls and of then realizing on transferred assets.' 8  Authority supporting
140). But the Ruling purports to be declaratory of the impact of the Order on unau-
thorized transactions in blocked assets. (Press Release No. 34, TREASURY DOCUMENTS,
supra note 1, at 100). Since the Order speaks only of prohibited transactions, without re-
gard to whether or not the property involved is in a-blocked account, it is arguable that
the declaratory interpretation embodied in General Ruling No. 12, though expressly ap-
plicable only to blocked accounts, equally illuminates the effect of the Order on other
categories of frozen property, or on any property in which a foreign national has an inter-
est.
Littauer likewise suggests that the declaration of nullity contained in General Ruling
No. 12 exceeds the scope of the President's delegation of authority to the Treasury De-
partment, since the Order speaks only of persons within the United States, while the Rul-
ing condemns transfers wherever attempted. But he notes that the Ruling was issued "By
direction of the President," which would seem to cure any defect in the prior delegation.
There is no doubt that the Congress intended to reach transfers outside the United States,
for the debates are replete with references to transfers under pressure of the invaders. [86
CoNG. REc. 5006-08, 5168-83 (1940)]. Looting could only be reached if transfers in the
looted countries were struck down. Nullification of improper transfers is in harmony
with various declarations of the United Nations, which are incompatible with endowing
tainted transfers with any legal consequences. Thus, on Jan. 5, 1943, a joint declaration
by the United States and seventeen other United Nations stated that they "reserve all
their rights to declare invalid any transfers of, or dealings with, property, rights and in-
terests of any description whatsoever which are, or have been situated in the territories
which have come under the occupation or control, direct or indirect,, of the governments
with which they are at war or which belong or have belonged to persons, including juridi-
cal persons, resident in such territories. This warning applies whether such transfers or
dealings have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or of transactions apparently
legal in form, even when they purport to be voluntarily effected." (TREASURY DOCUMENTS,
supra note 1, at 11.) A declaration of similar tenor respecting gold purchases was made
on February 22, 1944, when the United States (and, in similar pronouncements, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) announced that "[lit does not and will not recog-
nize the transference of title to the looted gold which the Axis at any time holds or has
disposed of in world markets." (TREAsURY DocUMENTS, supra note 1, at 11). Further evi-
dence of United Nations policy was given by Resolution No. VI of the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, July, 1944, approving steps
already taken to search out looted property and restore it to its lawful owners and recom-
mending immediate measures to prevent the transfer of property belonging to persons in
occupied countries. TREsuRy DocUMENTs, supra note 1, at 12.
18. Treasury Department Press Release No. 34 (TREASURY DOCUMENTS, supra
note 1, at 100), which accompanied the issuance of General Ruling No. 12, explained:
"This neutral black market operation would be designed to give the Axis immediate re-
turns on blocked assets even though the Axis could not get such assets out from under
our freezing regulations. In this case the assets would be assigned or otherwise trans-
ferred to neutral speculators at heavy dis6ount in order that the Axis could obtain credit
now to buy goods and services in neutral countries and thus assist the war effort. Of
course some of these black market operations would be for the obvious purpose of lining
the pockets of Axis officialdom as insurance against the day when the Axis is crushed.
Neutral speculators would either hold such assignments with the intent of salvaging on
them after the war or in the hope of being able to squeeze the blocked assets through the
freezing control by one trick or another." See also Brief for United States in the Polish
Relief case, supra note 2, pp. 7-9.
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the Treasury pronouncement in the very field of "freezing control" is
furnished by Schrijver v. Sutherland,"9 which held that a transfer (during
World War I) in Europe to a Dutch partnership of German-owned shares in
an American corporation was invalid under § 7(b) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act. If no more were involved, it would be, as Chief Justice Taney
remarked, a gross error
"to say that a contract, forbidden by an Act of Congress, or against its policy, was
not fraudulent and void, and that it might be enforced in a court of Justice .. .
But before concluding that unlicensed transactions may be regarded as
a complete nullity, one must take account of the administrative practice under
the Order. In permitting a license to be applied for "before, during or after"
a transfer,21 the Treasury Department countenanced unlicensed transactions
in blocked property, though still affirming that they would be "void and un-
enforceable" unless and until a license was issued.2 2  Moreover, in a curious
ruling which will be examined in detail later, the Treasury provided that, in
the event of litigation, any transfer affected by the Order shall
"be valid and enforceable for the purpose of determining for the parties to the action
or proceeding the rights and liabilities therein litigated . . ."
And despite the fact that the Treasury had stamped unlicensed transactions as
"unenforceable," it suggested to parties that
"they adjudicate such [disputed] claims before applying for a license to permit the
transfer of funds."! '
It should occasion no surprise that courts which have grappled with these
issues have been perplexed by the Treasury's apparently conflicting rulings
that an unlicensed transfer is "void and unenforceable" but must nevertheless
be regarded as "valid and enforceable" for the purposes of litigation. Al-
though the New York Court of Appeals, which has decided the two most
important cases in this field, got off to a good start in the Polish Relief case,25
it subsequently lost its footing and established principles in Singer v. Yoko-
19. 19 F.2d 688 (App. D. C. 1927).
20. Walworth v. Kneeland, 15 How. 348, 353 (U. S. 1853).
21. Paragraph (3), General Ruling No. 12, 7 FED. RE;. 2991 (1942).
22. Press Release No. 34, supra note 18.
23. Paragraph (4), General Ruling No. 12, stupra note 21.
24. Brief for United States in the Polish Relief case, suprc note 2, p. 14; see pp. 410-11,
infra.
25. Commission for Polish Relief, Ltd. v. Banca Nationala a Rumaniei, 288 N. Y.
332, 43 N. E.2d 345 (1942) ; 11 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 116 (1942) ; 37 ILL. L. REV. 270
(1942); 91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 260 (1942). See also Reeves, supra note 1, at 47-49;
Reeves, Policies of the United States Treasury As Applied to Blocked Funds in Litigation,
113 N. Y. L. J. 2180, 2200 (1945) ; comments in American Banker, Oct. 23, 1942, p. 3,
col. 2, and letter of Mr. Randolph E. Paul, General Counsel of the Treasury Department,
in response thereto. Id., Dec. 11, 1942, p. 3, col. 2.
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hama Specie Bank26 which, if left unchallenged, go far to sap the effectiveness
of the war-time controls. Its holdings will be analyzed in greater detail be-
low, but it may be noted here that the earlier Polish Relief case recognized
that:
"The words [in the Executive Order] of the Chief Executive of the nation must be
taken to have deprived the defendant of power to transfer any interest in these blocked
accounts except through the medium of assignment subject to a releasing of the credit
by the Secretary of the Treasury!"n
In contrast, the same court said in Singer v. Yokohama Specie Bank that
certain unlicensed dealings between the Yokohama Specie Bank and the
Standard Vacuum Oil Company
"served to create an enforcible legal obligation by the New York Agency [of the
Yokohama Specie Bank] to make such payment .... The fact that Federal regula-
tions governing transactions in foreign exchange prevent the payment to Standard
until a license under Executive Order No. 8389, as amended, is procured does not
make conditional the obligation of the New York Agency to pay." '
If the court meant to hold that an unlicensed transaction could create a
legal obligation, the enforceability of which was only postponed by the freez-
ing restrictions, it seems to follow that ultimate suspension of the controls will
result in reviving the transaction's enforceability. Such a consequence would
thwart a major objective of the Order: to destroy any opportunity for neutral
speculators to profit by dealing in blocked assets in the United States. More-
over, we believe that this result, which would frustrate the congressional
purpose of "preventing the passage of title" to frozen assets,29 finds no real
support in either the rulings or the administrative practice under the Order,
notwithstanding occasional lapses in the Treasury position which lend superfi-
cial color to it. A preliminary analysis of the Polish Relief and Singer cases
may furnish a background against which to examine the Treasury's rulings
and practice under the Order.
I. THE PoLIsH RELIMF AND SNGER CASES
The Polish Relief'case involved the question whether jurisdiction in rem
over an absent defendant could be acquired by the levy of state court attach-
ments against its blocked deposit accounts in several New York banks.30 The
United States was not a party to the suit, but in its brief as amicus curiae be-
fore the New York Court of Appeals argued that:
26. 293 N.Y. 542, 58 N. E.2d 726 (1944).
27. 288 N. Y. 332, 337, 43 N. E.2d 345, 347 (1942).
28. 293 N. Y. 542, 549, 550, 58 N. E.2d 726, 728 (1944).
29. See note 13 supra.
30. The plaintiff had received no license, but none was required to commence an ac-
tion. Brief for United States in the Polish Relief case, supra note 2, pp. 39-42. Payment
from the blocked accounts, even to the sheriff, could not be made without Treasury au-
thorization, however, as the court recognized.
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"An assignment by a national to A of the national's interest in a blocked account
does not divest the national of any interest in the account and does not vest any inter-
est in the account in A, unless and until such assignment is authorized by the Treasury
Department.
"An attachment action against a national's blocked account is an attempt to ob-
tain an unlicensed assignment of the national's interest in the blocked account-
nothing more and nothing less.
"In this sense, the attachment action might be regarded as a levy upon the na-
tionals (sic) contingent power (i.e., contingent upon Treasury authorization) to transfer
all his interest in the blocked account to A; any judgment in the attachment action
resulting in' giving A a contingent interest in the account equivalent to what he would
have obtained by voluntary assignment.!'"
The brief of the United States went on to express acquiescence in the levy of
an attachment if, but only if, under New York law a valid attachment could
be levied on such a "contingent power."3 2
A majority of the Court of Appeals, in upholding the attachments, ap-
parently adopted the rationale advanced in the brief of the United States, and
unequivocally repudiated the broad ground upon which the Supreme Court
and Appellate Division had upheld the levies:
"As read by the Special Term the Executive Order leaves open the way to an
'assignment of the defendant's claims against the banks that would carry the title.'
...The Appellate Division likewise conceived of the Order as a command which
'operates exclusively in personam upon the banks." We hold a different opinion in re-
spect of this question.
"The Executive Order is a check upon trading with the enemy. Its prime pur-
pose is to stop such uses of foreign property rights as might imperil national defense.
The words of the Chief Executive of the nation must be taken to have deprived the
defendant of power to transfer any interest in these blocked accounts except through
the medium of assignment subject to a releasing of the credit by the Secretary of the
Treasury."'
The majority went on to point out that the banks continued to owe debts
to the defendant, notwithstanding the defendant's inability, resulting from the
Order, to collect them. It concluded that the banks' liabilities were not
transmuted into contingent obligations and that they continued to be attach-
able:
"For all we know, payment of the blocked accounts to the credit of this action can be
permitted consistently with the purpose of the Order.... The lien of an attachment
is always hypothetical in some degree. A 'seizure subject to license' was, we think,
sufficient for the purpose of jurisdiction it rem over the deposits in question."'"
31. Id. at 50-52. The United States did not enter the case as amicus curiae until af-
ter the attachments had been upheld by the Supreme Court and Appellate Division; in-
deed, the Government's brief is dated April 21, 1942, while argument before the Court of
Appeals was had on March 18, 1942.
32. Id. at 53.
33. 288 N. Y. 332, 337, 43 N. E.2d 345, 347 (1942) (italics added).
34. Id. at 338, 43 N. E2d at 347.
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The minority even more forcibly declared that
"No transfer of title in the absence of a license is permitted by the wording of the
Executive Order, whether the transfer be by means of assignment or attachment."".
But it inferred from this fact, as to which there was agreement, that the de-
fendant's control over the accounts was too uncertain to be the subject of levy:
under New York law, saying that:
"What the plaintiff is seeking here is a res sufficiently illusory not to fall within the
all-inclusive prohibition of the Executive Order and at the same time to be sufficiently
substantial to afford a basis for jurisdiction. In my opinion such inconsistency seeks
the impossible. Hence within the authorities no attachment is possible."'
In sum, all judges of the Court of Appeals adopted the Treasury view
that no transfer of blocked assets could be accomplished either by voluntary
act or attachment, but the majority held that an attachment for jurisdictional
purposes could be based upon a blocked national's contingent right to transfer
when licensed.
In light of this unanimity respecting the impossibility of transferring any
interest in blocked property without a Treasury license, the Court's subse-
quent unanimous decision in Singer v. Yokohama Specie Bank"7 that an en-
forceable legal obligation was created by an unlicensed transaction in foreign
exchange though payment of the obligation was inhibited came as a complete
surprise. In the Singer case the plaintiff sought to enforce a claim arising out
of the delivery on August 27, 1941, by the Yokohama office of the Standard
Vacuum Oil Company to Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., in Japan of the yen
equivalent of $557,561.25 with instructions to pay the dollar amount to Stand-
ard in New York. Two days later, the Bank's New York Agency advised
Standard that it had received such instructions and that the amount was avail-
able for payment to Standard upon procurement of a Treasury license. Two
applications for such a license were denied by the Treasury Department.38
The Court of Appeals somewhat enigmatically stated that these dealings
"served to create an enforcilile legal obligation by the New York Agency to make
such payment .... The fact that Federal regulations governing transactions in for-
eign exchange prevent the payment to Standard until a license under Executive Order
No. 8389, as amended, is procured does not make conditional the obligation of the
New York Agency to pay."'
In a brief supporting a motion for reargument, the Government asked for
clarification, pointing out that the apparent holding that unlicensed transac-
35. Id. at 339, 43 N. E.2d at 348.
36. Id. at 341, 43 N. E.2d at 349.
37. 293 N. Y. 542, 58 N. E.2d 726 (1944).
38. Brief for United States as amnicw curiae, p. 6, Singer v. Yokohama SpecieBank;
293 N. Y. 542, 58 N. E.2d 726 (1944).
39. 293 N. Y. 542, 549, 550, 58'N. E.2d 726, 728 (1944).
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tions "gave rise to enforceable rights, subject only to control of payment"
would "defeat in large measure the efficacy" of the freezing controls. 40 The
motion was denied.41
It may be thought, since the Singer case leaves the Treasury with control
over payment, that the difference between the New York court and the Gov-
ernment is only one of semantics. But the Singer case appears to treat an un-
licensed transfer of frozen funds as a delayed action instrument, and this
could certainly encourage neutral speculators who took assignments of looted
credits to hope that patience in outwaiting freezing controls will ultimately be
rewarded.42  It also suggests that custodians of blocked accounts cannot
honor post-defrosting assignments of such accounts, at least not if they know
of the existence of earlier, though unlicensed, transfers. Then too, the pro-
tection of American creditors requires that the status quo of frozen assets be
maintained so that creditors may proceed against the property of their debt-
ors. Again, the vesting of blocked enemy accounts would be forestalled if un-
licensed assignments are held to pass title to or create liens against such ac-
counts.
To be sure, it is open to the Government to maintain the regulatory ma-
chinery of Executive Order No. 8389 permanently in force, and at some time
this could be coupled with an announcement that applications for licenses to
validate unlicensed transactions would no longer be entertained and that
licenses should be regarded as irrevocably denied to all transfers theretofore not
licensed. Thus unlicensed transactions would be rendered unenforceable in
perpetuity, though even this statement might not completely dispel the clouds
created by the Singer view of unlicensed transactions. And this device,
clumsy at best, would be superfluous were it not for the Singer case's mis-
interpretation of the effects of an unlicensed transaction.
II. INEFFECTIVENESS OF VOLUNTARY UNLICENSED TRANSFERS
Although transactions in foreign-owned property were prohibited by the
Executive Order under penalty of fine and imprisonment and although trans-
fers of blocked accounts were expressly voided, the Treasury Department as a
matter of administrative practice did not prosecute persons engaging in the
40. Brief for United States as ainicus curiae in support of respondent's motion for
reargunment, p. 3, Singer v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 293 N. Y. 542, 58 N. E.2d 726 (1944).
Recently Leeds v. Guaranty Trust Co. [65 N. Y. S. 2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1946)], cited the
Singer case for the- proposition that Executive Order No. 8389 "interdicted solely pay-
ment and not ... the assignment of a claim .... ." The Leeds case likewise relies on
Reeves, supra-note 25. But Reeves stated "It is not the purpose of this article to take a
position in regard to the correctness of interpretation of the Executive Order or the ulti-
mate significance of any position so taken, either as expressed by the Courts or by the
Treasury." Id. at 2200.
41. 294 N. Y.'689, 60 N. E.2d 842 (1945).
42. See note 18 supra.
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interdicted transactions. To the contrary, instead of requiring persons who
wished to engage in a forbidden transaction to obtain advance approval, the
Department uniformly not only countenanced but insisted upon the execution
by the parties of the instruments of transfer prior to applying for a license.
43
This practice was no doubt thought to be compelled by administrative exi-
gencies; the Treasury Department was thereby relieved of the task of passing
on hypothetical or contemplated transactions," while the national interest was
adequately protected by the justifiable assumption (now threatened by the
Singer case) that the transaction was totally ineffective to create or transfer
any interest in the blocked property unless and until properly licensed.
At this juncture we can glance with profit at the closely analogous Ger-
man experience with freezing control, because German jurists have given
extended consideration to the effects of a prohibited transaction in the interval
before it is licensed. Section 64(1) of the German Devisenrecht provides,
roughly speaking, that a prohibited transaction is nichtig or void. Sub-
section (2), in striking resemblance to the Treasury practice, declares that "if
the transaction is subsequently approved, it becomes effective from the time
of its inception."'45 It is not, therefore, an absolute nullity. Instead, German
writers and jurists are agreed that, until licensed, a transaction is merely in a
state of suspense; it is ineffective (schwebend unwirksam)4" and has no legal
consequences. 47 Juristically speaking, a contract is merely a relation to which'
the State lends its sanctions if the parties have complied with certain formal
requirements, such as consideration, assent and the like. The State may impose
the additional requirement that the parties obtain express State approval before
the contractual relation will be given effect. 48 Just as we are accustomed to say
that lacking the "consent" of both parties there is no contract, so we may con-
clude that there is no contract in the absence of the "consent" by the State.
In fine, the unlicensed contract is not an incurable nullity; it is merely in a state
of ineffective suspense until licensed.
43. Reeves, supra note 1, at 45; Reeves, supra note 25, at 2180.
44. In the fiscal year 1944-45 the federal reserve banks and the Treasury Foreign Funds
Control received 101,000 applications for licenses. Uxn'zn STATES SEc!Y OF TREFAs. ANNUAL
REP. 1945, p. 206 (1946).
45. For text and summary history see GIEsE & NIEaMANN, KOMMENTAR ZUM
DEV1SENGESETZ 438 (ed. 1942). Subsection (2), which was added by an amendment, re-
solved the problem whether an absolutely void transaction can be cured. Cf. Peltzer, Die
Nichtigkeit im Devisengesetz, 5 ZEIT. DER AKAD. F. DEUT. RwEHT. 57, 58 (1938) ; Blau,
Devisenrecht und Privatrecht, 83 JIIERING's JAHRBf4CHER 201, 224 (1933). In our own
law, question has arisen whether an absolutely void transaction, in the sense of having "no
legal existence for any purpose," or being a "blank piece of paper," [Cecil B. De Mille
Productions v. Woolery, 61 F.2d 45, 49, 53 (C. C. A. 9th 1932) (contract violating li-
censing statute)] could be validated by a subsequent curative act. McLain v. Oklahoma
Cotton Growers' Assn., 125 Okla. 264, 258 Pac. 269 (1927).
46. Peltzer, supra note 45, at 57, 58; GIEsE & NiEmANN, op. cit. supra note 45 at
444; KOPPE-BLAu, DAS GESAmTE DEVISENRECHT 38 (1932).
47. GIsz & NIEMANN, op. cit. supra note 45 at 444; Peltzer, supra note 45, at 58.
48. See Peltzer, supra note 45, at 58; GrsE & NIEMANN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 444.
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This rationalization not only explains the Treasury practice, but it also
'reflects the intention of Congress. Senator Wagner emphasized that the freez-
ing control
"does not absolutely prohibit the transfers, it merely provides that the Government
may investigate to determine whether the transfer was made voluntarily or under
duress ..
'But this statement is,' of course, to be read in conjunction with the parallel in-
tention of preventing the passage of title by an unlicensed transaction.50
-ence, it will not do to treat thetransaction as voidable, i.e., as effective un-
less and until voided, for that-would throw upon the Treasury the burden of
ferreting out thousands of transactions for which no license application will
ever be made. To accomplish the objectives of freezing control, it is neces-
sary to conclude that no interest in blocked property can be created or trans-
ferred by an unlicensed'transaction. This view preserves the freedom of the
parties to negotiate and to launch "agreements," without trenching upon the
efficacy of the freezing controls.51
III. INEFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL TRANSFERS
There remains the reliance of the Singer case on Paragraph (4) of Gen-
eral Ruling No. 12,52 a matter best viewed against the relation of freezing
controls to transfers by judicial process. We have seen that a blocked na-
tional cannot transfer any interest in his property without a license, and that
the execution of documents of transfer does not confer on the transferee any
interest in the property. Can a transfer which may not be achieved by
voluntary act of the parties be accomplished by resort to the courts? Pre-
liminarily, we may also inquire, though the question has not been raised by the
courts, whether the Trading with the Enemy Act was intended to authorize
curtailment of traditional state judicial processes.
49. 86 CONG. REc. 5007 (1940). The legislative intention, of course, governs on the
content to be given the "voidness." See Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79, 84 (U. S. 1851).
50. See note 13 supra.
51. The theory that an unlicensed transaction is suspended and ineffective raises ques-
tions as to intervening events in the period between its physical inception and its approval
by Treasury action. When licensed, does the transaction become effective ab initio or as
-of the time the license issues? The German statute specifies effectiveness ab initio, and it
.would seem possible to achieve the same result by Treasury regulation. What of the effect
of the transaction on intervening rights? Is either party free to retreat from the contract
if a license is refused? It seems unjust to hold a party to a contract for an indeterminate
period, yet licenses have occasionally been granted after several denials. Similar problems
are noted in the German literature. Ginsa & NIFMANN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 444;
KoPPE-BLAu, op. cit. sutra note 46, at 39, 40.
52. 7 FED. REG. 2991 (1942). Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank [288 N. Y.
'342, 43 N. E.2d 434 (1944)], also cited in the Singer case, scarcely advances the argu-
ment, for it was decided on the same day as the Singer case, and as Judge Finch remarked
in a concurring opinion, the Executive Order was not in issue and there was no attempt
to effect a tiansfer of title of the original owner.
.408
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The first formal expression on this question is found in General Ruling
No. 12, -issued on the eve of the Government's intervention as amicus curiae
in the Polish Relief case. The Ruling defines "transfer" to include not only
voluntary acts, but also
"the issuance, docketing, filing, or the levy of or under any judgment, decree, attach-
ment, execution, or other judicial or administrative process or order, or the service of
any garnishment." (Paragraph 5(a)).
Since General Ruling No. 12 was issued "by direction of the President," we
may take this definition as a presidential construction of the term "transfer"
as it appears in Section 5(b), as amended, of the Trading with the Enemy
Act. 4 An analogous use of the term "transfer" to comprehend attempts
to pass an interest by judicial proceedings is found in the Bankruptcy Act,
Section 67 of which nullifies certain "transfers", including those resulting
from judicial proceedings.5 5 True, Section 5(b) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act does not contain the express legislative definition of "transfer"
embodied in the Bankruptcy Act. And it may be thought that the need for
accommodating state and federal powers suggests a more restrictive interpre-
tation here. But an exclusion of judicial "transfers" from the impact of
regulations promulgated under Section 5 (b) would invite persons denied the
benefit of a voluntary transfer to resort to judicial proceedings, thereby de-
feating the regulatory scheme. The Singer case shows what the consequences
might be. If by judicial proceedings an unlicensed assignment can be found
to create a valid obligation-though temporarily unenforceable-it is highly
probable that the custodian of a blocked account would decline to honor any
subsequent orders respecting the account. This probability would develop
into certainty if the transferee pursued his advantage through the medium of
an attachment. The transferee would then have accomplished by aid of the
courts a result which he could not have obtained through voluntary act; al-
though he would still be unable to obtain full control over ihe property, he
would have succeeded in insulating it from the control of others and in vastly
improving his chance of getting it upon the lifting of the freezing controls.
Cold practicality, then, dictates the necessity of treating-as General Ruling
No. 12 does-judicial transfers in the same fashion as transfers by the parties.
Nor does this interpretation require a strain on the language of the Trading
with the Enemy Act. In spite of intimations from time to time that general
53. As a result of this definition of "transfer" to include every species of judicial
process, any transfer of blocked property by judicial process comes within the general re-
strictions on transfers created by 1111 (1) and (2) of the Ruling, and is void unless li-
censed.
54. 55 STAT. 839 (1941), 50 U. S. C. App. § 616 (1946 Supp.).
55. 52 STAT. 875 (1938), 11 U. S. C. 107(d) (1940); see § 1 (30), 52 STAT. 840
(1938), 11 U. S. C 1 (30) (1940), defining "transfer" to include every mode "of parting
with property or with an interest therein... by or without judicial proceedings ... " ,
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language in federal statutes should not be construed to include action by agen-
cies of the states, the prevailing view has been that express mention of the states
is not necessary to bring their activities within the scope of federal law.60 Of
course, there is no question of federal power to do so, where exemption of the
states or their agencies "would undermine, if not destroy, the single control
which it was one of the dominant purposes of the Congress to create."51
Here, too, we are faced with the possibility that the necessary single federal
control may be frustrated by state action. The paramount federal power in
this area is illustrated by Section 9(f) of the Trading with the Enemy Act,
which long has immunized vested property from judicial process. 8 By Gen-
eral Ruling No. 12 the president has directed that a similar immunity must be
accorded to immobilized property. The fact that vesting is the instrument of
control in the one case while blocking has been employed in the other should
not spell the difference between immunity from and liability to state process.
The president's determination that blocked property must not be transferred,
even by judicial process, will be given great weight by the courts.t °
It would hardly be necessary to stress this point were it not for Para-
graph (4) of General Ruling No. 12, cited in the Singer case and mentioned
earlier, which provides that an unlicensed transfer shall
"be valid and enforceable for the purpose of determining for the parties to the action
or proceeding the rights and liabilities therein litigated . . .!
This paragraph, it has been said, embodied the Treasury policy of consider-
ing an application for a license only on a showing "that the blocked national
to be charged had consented to the transfer or that a judgment had been
entered against him." 1 Apparently this policy was founded on an unarticu-
56. See Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 (1934); cf. New York v. United
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946).
57. University of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 59 (1933). A different question
is presented where no congressional policy will be impaired by allowing the state full
sway in the exercise of its admitted powers, [cf. Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control
Comm'n, 318 U. S. 261, 274, 275 (1943)], or where Congress has indicated a desire to bow
to state control which was not likely to impair the federal policy. Cf. Davies Warehouse
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 151, 152 (1944).
58. 41 STAT. 977 (1920), 50 U. S. C. App. § 9(f) (1940). Cf. Brown v. Gerdes, 321
U. S. 178 (1944). The Court'said the restrictions imposed by the Bankruptcy Act "cause
any conflicting procedure in the state courts to give way." Id. at 183. See Great North-
ern R. R. v. Sutherland, 273 U. S. 182, 193, 194 (1927) ; Hicks v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R., 10 F.2d 606, 609 (D. Md. 1926), which arose under the Trading with the Enemy
Act.
59. It must not be forgotten that the federal government and especially the president
are endowed with unusually broad powers in the field of international affairs. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936) ; cf. United States v. Von
Clemm, 136 F.2d 968 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 769 (1943).
60. 7 FED. REG. 2991 (1942). The Treasury has reaffirmed that an unlicensed attach-
ment transfers no interest. Pub. Circular No. 31, Aug. 2, 1946.
61. Reeves, mipra note 1, at 45. (Reeves was with the Treasury Foreign Funds Con-
trol during 1941-1943. Editor's note to Reeves, supra note 25, at 2180). Yet the grant of
a license in a case where the liability of the blocked national was in dispute need not have
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lated prejudice against what might be called "advisory licenses," a prejudice
against examining license applications unless it was clear that the proposed
transfers could be consummated. But this practice was a departure from the
traditional preliminary administrative sifting in favor of an attempt to obtain
a judicial sifting as "a condition precedent to [administrative] consideration
of an application" for a license. 62  The suggestion that the claimant litigate
his rights before applying for a license is especially surprising because an
issue which necessarily would be presented to the courts, at least implicitly, in
such a proceeding would be the existence of "consideration" for the contract.
Yet this is an issue as to which the Treasury Department could not abdicate
its responsibility; it is abundantly clear that one of the principal functions of
the licensing system was to decide whether an attempted transfer had been
made under duress rather than for adequate consideration. Since as to such
questions the Treasury Department could not give finality to the invited judi-
cial proceedings, and since a judgment in any case would be only a prelude to
administrative proceedings, little room was left by Paragraph (4) for more
than an advisory opinion.
Somewhat belated recognition of this fact is found in the Government's
brief in the Singer case:
"Of course, plaintiff conceivably may be asldng this Court to enter a judgment (as-
suming it deems the facts so to warrant) in effect adjudicating that but for the
[freezing] Order the plaintiff would have been a creditor of the New York Agency
and that he can achieve that status if the Secretary of the Treasury should, in the fu-
ture, license the transaction under the Order. Since this would raise no federal ques-
tion, the United States would in that event have no interest and no objection. But
such a judgment would be merely advisory since only the Treasury's later determina-
tion could make it effective. The decisions of this Court indicate that it will not un-
dertake to enter a finding which will have 'none of the authority of a judgment': '
In arguing that the court should not enter a finding with "none of the au-
thority of a judgment," the brief of the United States cited cases which are in
point only if the Treasury Department reserved the authority to re-examine
the conclusions of the court.64
been interpreted as anything more than a statement that the Treasury Department inter-
posed no objection to the transfer. This would have left the blocked national "to be charged"
free to deny liability on such non-freezing grounds as the statute of frauds, set-off, and
accord and satisfaction.
62. Ibid. The Treasury Department said that it "regards the courts as the appro-
priate place to decide disputed claims.... The Treasury Department did not feel that it
could finally pass on an application for a license to transfer blocked assets where the facts
were disputed or liability denied." Brief for United States in the Polish Relief case, supra
note 2, p. 14.
63. See note 38 supra, at p. 28; see also the Brief for United States in the Singer case,
supra note 40, pp. 7, 8.
64. In United States v. Ferreira [13 How. 40 (U. S. 1851)], the Court dismissed for
want of jurisdiction an appeal from a district judge's allowance of a claim under a statute
providing that the decision on a claim should be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treas-
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Whether or not Paragraph (4) leaves the courts room for more than an
advisory opinion is not in our view decisive. What should be controlling is
the limiting proviso of that paragraph which the Singer case inexplicably
overlooks. The proviso declares:
"[P]rovided, however, that no attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnish-
ment, or other judicial process shall confer or create a greater right, power, or privi-
lege with respect to, or interest in, any property in a blocked account than the owner
of such property could create or confer by voluntary act prior to the issuance of an
appropriate license."'
Thus the invitation to the courts, expressed in Paragraph (4), to take juris-
diction of unlicensed transactions is expressly limited so as to foreclose the
judicial transfer of any interest in the property unless licensed.
Since there is no serious doubt respecting the power of the president,
under Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, to promulgate the
freezing controls, it would follow that in the absence of Paragraph (4) a
court would be constrained to hold that an unlicensed transaction (including
an unlicensed judicial transfer) could not transfer any interest in blocked
property. Possibly this would not altogether foreclose litigation involving un-
licensed transactions, but certainly little inducement would be left for any
proceedings having more than peripheral contact with such transactions. The •
illusory. relaxation embodied in Paragraph (4), which permits the transfer to
be considered valid for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties, is
by the express terms of the proviso so limited as to exclude a transfer of
blocked property by judicial process. Paragraph (4) cannot be read in dis-
regard of this proviso, or so as to nullify the sweeping terms of the rest of
General Ruling No. 12. Even apart from the clear limitation of the proviso,
Paragraph (4) should not be so read as to enable an assignee of blocked
property, who has no license, to evade the impact of the freezing controls by
recourse to judicial proceedings. Such a construction would plainly frustrate
the executive and legislative intention.
This was the position recently taken in Markham v. Taylor,0 when the
issue was first presented to a federal court. The claim of a state court re-
ury for payment if he was satisfied that it was just and equitable; Il. re Richardson [247
N. Y. 401, 410, 160 N. E. 655, 657 (1928)] struck dovn the appointment of a New York
Supreme Court justice as a prosecutor, "the delegate of the Governor in aid of an execu-
tive act, the removal of a public officer," his function being to take testimony and report
his findings to the governor; In re Workman's Compensation Fund [224 N. Y. 13, 119
N. E. 1027 (1918)] was a refusal to answer a question posed in a non-adversary proceed-
ing, related to no pending controversy, by the State Industrial Commission, which wished
advice (which might then be as freely rejected as accepted) respecting its power to adopt
a resolution proposed by one of its members.
65. Paragraph (4), General Ruling No. 12, 7 FED. REG. 2991 (1942).
66. S. D. N. Y., Jan. 21, 1947.
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ceiver to "frozen" assets was denied in the absence of license .on the ground
that the prohibitions of the Executive Order, put beyond doubt by the express
terms of Paragraph (1) and the Paragraph (4) proviso of General Ruling
No. 12, were "as appfiable to a transfer by judicial process as to a transfer
by voluntary act."
CONCLUSION
The backbone of the "freezing" program was the denial of legal effect to
unauthorized transactions so far as they purport to transfer property in
blocked accounts. in the Treasury's financial war on neutral speculators, a
principal objective was the' destruction of the hope that an assignment of
frozen assets will become enforceable when freezing restrictions are abro-
gated. To achieve this objective, the Treasury has properly adopted the posi-
tion that an unlicensed transfer creates no rights to a blocked account.
Under General Ruling No. 12, issued "by direction of the President," an
unlicensed attachment is a "transfer," and accordingly it is ineffective to
confer or create any rights to or interest in blocked assets. Nothing in Sec-
tion 5(b), Executive Order No. 8389, or General Ruling No. 12 affords any
foundation for distinguishing between the transfer of rights or interests by
judicial process and the transfer of rights or interests by voluntary act of the
parties. To the contrary, Section 5(b) and the Order speak only of "trans-
actions," and in General Ruling No. 12 there is a studied effort to keep judi-
cial process on the same level as voluntary acts so far as the transfer of rights
to blocked assets is concerned. Consequently, if it be conceded that an un-
licensed attachment can result in a transfer 'of rights, there is no basis in the
Order or regulations under it for'denying similar effect to a voluntary act.
The Polish Relief case does not hold to the contrary. It bowed to the
paramountcy of federal control in this field by acknowledging that the owner
of a blocked account had no power "to transfer any interest" in the account
except by the Treasury's leave. There was no holding that the attachment
created any interest that could not be created by voluntary act; the decision
that the attachment would support jurisdiction in rem in no sense necessitates
the conclusion that the attachment generated any other consequences.
The Singer case is to the contrary. But if its rationale is to be accepted,
not only judicial process but also voluntary acts, though unlicensed, can effect
a transfer of an interest in blocked property. This theory imperils a vital
purpose of freezing controls, which was to deprive neutral speculators of the
prospect that they could obtain ownership of blocked assets by outwaiting the
Treasury Department. Paragraph (4), upon which the Singer case rests
heavily, invited an exercise of judicial jurisdiction which courts are unable
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to undertake because they are not authorized to act as an advisory adjunct to
an administrative agency, and because in the absence of license there is no
effective contract and hence no cause of action to which the courts can lend
enforcement. But the fact that Paragraph (4) should never have been issued
does not warrant an interpretation of it which ignores the limiting proviso and
threatens the entire structure of freezing controls.
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